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INTRODUCTION
Should elected judges interpret statutes differently than
appointed judges? The implicit answer of statutory interpretive
theorists seems to be no. They typically describe their approach-
es to statutory interpretation in universal terms independent of
the form of the institution that is taking on the task. To take
two recent theories of statutory interpretation that revolution-
ized legal and academic thinking, when Professor William N.
Eskridge, Jr. called for courts to dynamically interpret statutes
to account for evolving public values, he seemed to assume that
elected judges and appointed judges were equally competent to
do so.1 When Justice Antonin Scalia advocated in his seminal
book, A Matter of Interpretation, for judges to place more focus
on the text of the statute and less on its legislative history, state
judges, and by extension the institution of elected judges,
seemed to be entirely invisible.2 These omissions are surprising
t Assistant Professor Law, University of California-Berkeley School of Law. A
special thanks to Joy Milligan for her extraordinarily helpful comments.
1 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U Pa
L Rev 1007, 1009 n 4 (1989) (noting that the observations about the current use of public
values in statutory interpretation apply to both state and federal courts). See generally
William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479, 1482-
97 (1987) (describing the theory of dynamic statutory interpretation, which calls for
statutes to be interpreted "in light of their present societal, political, and legal context").
2 See generally Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law (Princeton 1997) (advocating against judicial discretion in the application of the
law). Justice Scalia's exclusive focus on federal appointed judges is reflected in the book's
subtitle.
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once one considers that elected judges decide the vast majority
of all cases nationwide.
Professors Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl and Ethan J. Leib in
their article, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, make
visible what was previously invisible: the institutional difference
between elected judges and appointed judges.3 And they assess
what this difference might mean for the interpretation of stat-
utes. The mere introduction of this issue is worthy of praise as it
opens up a promising new area for scholarly exploration. Bruhl
and Leib, however, do not stop there. They also offer a balanced
case for two potential views of statutory interpretation by elect-
ed judges: first, the conventional view that elected judges should
interpret statutes in the same way as appointed judges-a case
for interpretive convergence-and second, a case for the novel
view that elected judges should interpret statutes differently
from appointed judges-a case for interpretive divergence.4
While Bruhl and Leib are openly agnostic about the choice be-
tween interpretive convergence and divergence, their analysis
suggests that if pushed to choose a side, they might side with a
theory of interpretive divergence. For this reason, and because
of the novelty of an argument for interpretive divergence, this
Essay focuses on the case for interpretive divergence.
In this Essay, I argue that the case for interpretive diver-
gence is weaker than Bruhl and Leib suggest. While election and
appointment are quite distinct ways of selecting judges, this dif-
ference in institutional form may ultimately mean less than
they think. First, as a historical matter, the case for interpretive
divergence relies on an oversimplification about the reasons un-
derlying the choice of the two selection methods. While the au-
thors explore some of the history of state decisions to adopt judi-
cial elections, they ignore the history underlying the federal
constitutional Framers' choice to adopt judicial appointments
with permanent tenure. Paradoxically, what the two histories
3 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhi and Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Inter-
pretation, 79 U Chi L Rev 1215 (2012). Consistent with Bruhi and Leib, the focus of the
Essay here is on federal appointed judges as opposed to state appointed judges. It is im-
portant to recognize that eight states maintain systems of appointing judges to office
without subjecting them to popular retention elections. See Neil Devins and Nicole
Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U Pa J Const L 455, 463-64
(2010) (noting that Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, New York, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Virginia have such systems). The arguments that apply here should be
applicable to state appointed judges as well, but proof of that hypothesis is beyond the
scope of this Essay.
4 For a discussion of the cases for interpretive convergence and interpretive diver-
gence, see Part I.
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show is that the federal government and the states adopted two
seemingly diametrically opposed selection models for essentially
the same reasons: to reinforce the separation of powers between
the judicial, legislative, and executive branches and to allow
courts to retain decisional independence from popular pressures.
Second, the case for interpretive divergence is weaker than
suggested because it essentializes accountability. It assumes
that judges are accountable to the people for the same things as
other elected officials. Specifically, it assumes that voters hold
judges accountable for how well they represent the immediate
interests of the people, assessing judges in exactly the same way
that they do legislators. The contrast between how states have
designed judicial elections as compared to other elections sug-
gests that this is not the case. Since their adoption in the mid-
nineteenth century, states have designed judicial elections to
maintain the decisional independence of judges from popular
pressures. They have done so by limiting voters' access to the in-
formation necessary to hold judges accountable for how well
their decisions represent the interests of the people. In the place
of accountability to popular preferences, states have tried to sus-
tain, through the design of judicial elections, a different form of
accountability: judges' accountability to the people for their fair-
ness and impartiality in administering and interpreting the
laws. This form of accountability is not any different from that
expected of judges appointed with life tenure.
As Bruhl and Leib and other scholars have noted, however,
judicial elections are changing. They have been transformed
from low-key, low-information affairs into competitive contests
in which voters choose judges on the basis of highly salient is-
sues that come before the courts. Bruhl and Leib argue that this
evolution in the form of judicial elections supports the case for
interpretive divergence. However, this claim depends on three
assumptions about the changing form of elections. Bruhl and
Leib assume, first, that the increase in "meaningful judicial elec-
tions" has led to greater judicial responsiveness to the people.5
Second, that meaningful elections provide state judges with
guidance on statutory interpretive questions that tend not to be
particularly salient. Third, that appointed judges are insulated
and unresponsive to public opinion. All three assumptions lack
empirical support. Even in the context of what Bruhl and Leib
describe as meaningful judicial elections, federal appointed and
5 Bruh1 and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1234 (cited in note 3).
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state elected judges are similarly competent to draw on public
opinion in their interpretation of statutes.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. In the first Part, I de-
scribe the authors' case for interpretive convergence and diver-
gence, spending much of the space on the case for the latter. In
the second Part, I elaborate on the three reasons why we should
reconsider the case for interpretive divergence.
I. THE CASE FOR INTERPRETIVE DIVERGENCE
In exploring whether elected judges should interpret stat-
utes differently from appointed judges, Bruhl and Leib offer a
balanced case for interpretive convergence and for interpretive
divergence. The case for interpretive convergence, or an ap-
proach in which elected and appointed judges interpret statutes
similarly, is premised on the conventional view that the judicial
role in a system of separated powers is to serve as a faithful
agent of the legislature.6 According to this faithful-agent ac-
count, the role of the legislature is to make law and the role of
judges is to interpret the law consistent with the legislature's
preferences.7 Since the states, including those with judicial elec-
tions, have adopted a similar understanding of separated powers
in their constitutions, the role of the judge as a faithful agent of
the legislature is universal and supports interpretive conver-
gence between appointed and elected judges.8 In addition, rule of
law considerations bolster the case for interpretive convergence.
Judicial impartiality might be threatened if individual legal out-
comes varied depending on a judge's electoral considerations9
Further, elections seem unlikely to provide judges with con-
sistent, reliable information about preferences that they could
use to craft coherent approaches to statutory interpretation.o
The authors contrast this case for interpretive convergence
with a case for interpretive divergence. Since it is the focus of
this Essay, I describe the latter case in a little more detail. Pro-
fessors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule's institutionalist
framework for statutory interpretation animates the case for di-
vergence. This statutory interpretation framework seeks to
6 Id at 1229-30 (cited in note 3) ("If the principal inquiry in statutory cases is dis-
covery of the will of the legislature, the status of the judge herself-whether elected or
appointed-does not change" the way she should interpret the law).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Bruhl and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1226-27 (cited in note 3).
10 Id at 1225-26, 1231-32.
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move the scholarly discussion beyond the question of how text
should be interpreted to the question of how institutions, given
their capabilities and limitations, should interpret text.11 Apply-
ing this framework, Bruhl and Leib argue that because of differ-
ences in the means of selection, elected judges have different
competencies and relationships with the other parts of the gov-
ernment than appointed judges and should therefore interpret
statutes differently. As an initial matter, the authors explain,
"The institution of judicial elections undermines the democracy-
based rationale for the faithful-agent account."12 Since elected
judges are selected by and directly accountable to the people, it
is not clear why they should be subordinate to the legislature in
their interpretation of statutes. 13 In addition, Bruhl and Leib
support the case for interpretive divergence from the perspective
of relative competence. Because elected judges must secure votes
from the people to remain in office while appointed judges have
life tenure, the former have an advantage in discerning public
opinion. Elected judges have a stronger "degree of political savvy
and comprehension" and can better "gaug[e] the most important
public reactions." 14 They can also draw on the information of the
judicial elections themselves (assuming they are meaningful) as
well as "their reading of the community's general sensibilities"
to be more responsive to the people in their interpretation of
statutes.15
The authors support the institutionalist case for divergence
with an argument from history. Several states adopted judicial
elections to replace the political appointment of judges in the mid-
nineteenth century. Relying on recent historical accounts,16 the
authors argue that the shift to judicial elections arose out of grow-
ing distrust of corrupt and ineffectual legislatures.17 This inspired
reformers to empower the judicial branch to serve as a counter-
weight by providing judges with a separate base of power-the
11 See generally Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institu-
tions, 101 Mich L Rev 885 (2002).
12 Bruh1 and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1244-45 (cited in note 3).
13 See id.
14 Id at 1250-51.
15 Id.
16 Bruh1 and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1242, citing Jed Handelsman Shugerman,
Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 Harv L Rev
1061, 1065-69, 1097 (2010); Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for
the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am J Legal Hist 190, 207,
217-19 (1993).
17 See Bruhl and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1242 (cited in note 3).
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people.18 According to Bruhl and Leib, the reasons for the adop-
tion of judicial elections "support forms of divergence that grant
elected judges greater independence from the legislature or re-
quires greater consideration of popular views (or both)."19 The
authors acknowledge that since their adoption, judicial elections
have undergone reform in many states. These reforms included
the widespread adoption of nonpartisan and merit-selection pro-
cesses. 2 0 By 2010, only six states retained partisan elections ei-
ther at the initial selection stage, the retention stage, or both.21
Despite these reforms, the authors focus their case for diver-
gence on the partisan election holdovers, arguing that "[i]f a
state subjects its judges to partisan elections every four years,
that is probably because it does not want its judges to be like
federal judges."22
II. RECONSIDERING THE CASE FOR DIVERGENCE
How strong is the case for interpretive divergence? In this
Part, I address each of the arguments favoring a divergence be-
tween how elected and appointed judges interpret statutes. For
purposes of organization, I focus first on the argument from his-
tory. I introduce a more nuanced account of the historical pur-
pose of the federal model of appointing judges and granting
them with life tenure and compare it to the purpose underlying
the adoption of partisan elections by a majority of the states in
the mid-nineteenth century. I argue that despite the obvious dif-
ferences in the two selection methods, both were designed to
achieve the same result: judicial independence from the political
branches and judicial accountability to the federal or state con-
stitution. Second, I engage the interpretive divergence claim that
state selection processes were intended to make judges accounta-
ble to the immediate interests of the people. I argue states re-
formed judicial selection methods through the adoption of non-
partisan elections and merit selections, as well as state imposition
of limits on the ability of judicial candidates to announce views on
disputed legal or political issues, to avoid this very form of ac-
countability. Third, I examine the case for interpretive divergence
18 Id. See also Part II.A.
19 Bruh1 and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1242 (cited in note 3).
20 See id.
21 See Devins and Mansker, 13 U Pa J Const L at 463-64 (cited in note 3) (noting
that only Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia hold par-
tisan elections for the initial selection of judges, the retention of judges, or both).
22 Bruhl and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1243 (cited in note 3).
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from the current baseline of more meaningful judicial elections.
On the basis of a more nuanced account about the effect of
meaningful elections on state judges and the responsiveness of
the decisions of federal judges to public opinion, I argue that the
two types of judges are more similar than the case for interpre-
tive divergence suggests.
A. Reconsidering History
An important consideration in the case for interpretive di-
vergence is the historic purpose of the two systems of selection.
While they discuss the historical purpose of the state election
system, Bruhl and Leib seem to assume that the purpose under-
lying the adoption of the federal system of appointment with life
tenure differs. This assumption provides critical support for the
institutionalist argument for divergence. In this Section, I argue
that the historic purpose of the adoption of the two selection sys-
tems share much more in common than the authors
acknowledge.
1. The history of federal adoption of the system of judicial
appointment with tenure.
One of the complaints that the Americans made against
King George III in the Declaration of Independence was that
"[h]e ha[d] made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for their
tenure of their office, and the amount and payment of their sala-
ries."23 Rather than being independent to adjudicate laws and
decide cases in an impartial way, the colonists considered Crown
judges to be just another instrument of imperial power. This
suspicion of judicial power manifested itself in the Articles of
Confederation, which established no permanent courts and
made limited provision for the exercise of judicial power. 24 As
part of the effort to design a federal government that was more
effective than the Articles had been in "provid[ing] for the com-
mon defence, promot[ing] the general Welfare, and secur[ing]
the Blessings of Liberty,"25 the Framers of the Constitution es-
tablished a federal system of courts with the judicial power of
23 United States Declaration of Independence 11 (1776).
24 In Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, most of the power to adjudicate
disputes was given to the Congress. Articles of Confederation Art IX, § 2. Congress did
have the authority to establish temporary courts "for the trial of piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas [and] for receiving and determining finally appeals in all
cases of captures." Articles of Confederation Art IX, § 1.
25 US Const Preamble.
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the United States.26 Judges to these courts were to be nominated
by the executive and subject to confirmation in the Senate. Once
confirmed, they held "offices during good Behaviour" and "re-
ceive[d] for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office."27
Why did the Framers choose this method of selection with
indefinite tenure?28 Alexander Hamilton justified the choice in a
critical piece of propaganda to support ratification of the Consti-
tution in the states-the Federalist Papers. In Federalists 78
and 79, Hamilton explained that the goal of the selection process
and tenure was to secure judicial independence from the politi-
cal branches of government. 29 Such branch independence was
necessary to ensure that judges had the independence to decide
cases impartially-something scholars have described as "deci-
sional independence."30 As Hamilton famously explained, be-
cause the judiciary lacks Force or Will, it "is in continual jeop-
ardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by its co-ordinate
branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its fair-
ness and independence, as permanency in office, this quality
may therefore be justly regarded . . . as the citadel of the public
justice and the public security."31
What is often overlooked is that Hamilton also intended for
the form of selection and tenure to secure the accountability of
federal judges to the interests of the people. He, however, equated
the will of the people with the Constitution soon to be ratified by
the people while distinguishing the people's will from legislative
will. As Hamilton explained, "[W]here the will of the legislature
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people
declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by
26 US Const Art III, § 1.
27 US Const Art III, § 1.
28 In certain respects, the method of selection was not that different from that
which existed in England before, where judges held office during good behavior. See Ir-
ving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L J 681, 700 (1979). According
to Professor Irving R. Kaufman, the "[d]enial to the colonies of the benefits of an inde-
pendent judiciary enjoyed in England was one of the grievances that led to the Revolu-
tion." Id (noting that this denial naturally led to the adoption of England's version of life
tenure).
29 Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 522-30 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob
E. Cooke, ed) (advocating for the life tenure of federal judges); Federalist 79 (Hamilton),
in The Federalist 531, 531-34 (cited in note 29) (advocating for "a fixed provision" for the
support of federal judges).
30 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 Ohio St L J 43, 51
(2003).
31 Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist at 523-24 (cited in note 29).
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the latter, rather than the former."32 The Constitution served the
people's will by establishing a framework of limited government
designed to protect the general liberty of the people by separating
executive and legislative powers as well as federal and state pow-
er, while designating a set of rights that government could not
encroach upon. To the extent judges were independent from the
other branches through permanent tenure in office, they could be
accountable to the people's will by faithfully defending the Consti-
tution against legislative and executive encroachment.33
Importantly, Hamilton distinguished this form of judicial
accountability to the people from the form of accountability
served by election to political office. Whereas election to political
office was designed to ensure accountability to the current popu-
lar preference, the appointment of judges with permanent ten-
ure was designed to ensure accountability to the will of the peo-
ple reflected in the Constitution even when it ran contrary to
popular preferences.34 Judicial independence served the interest
of judicial accountability to the people through the Constitution
by allowing judges to defend the Constitution against "ill hu-
mors" and temporary passions without fear of removal.35
The impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase is
a key episode that sustained the judicial independence of federal
judges, in sharp contrast to many state judicial systems in place
after the ratification of the Constitution. According to even his de-
fenders during his House impeachment trial, Justice Chase was
not a good judge.36 He was a Federalist judge who famously exhib-
ited partiality on the bench in the trials of individuals charged
with criticizing the Federalist administration of John Adams and
for treason. 37 Justice Chase also at one point directly criticized the
Republican administration of Thomas Jefferson from the bench
32 Id at 525.
33 See generally Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521 (cited in note 29).
34 As Alexander Hamilton elaborated:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the constitution
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts
of designing men, or the influence of particular conjectures, sometimes dissem-
inate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place
to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency in the
mean time, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community.
Id at 537.
35 Id.
36 See William H. Rehnquist, Political Battles for Judicial Independence, 50 Wash
L Rev 835, 839 (1975) (describing the views of Justice Chase held by his defenders).
37 See id at 837.
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when reading a grand jury charge.38 These judicial indiscretions
and others were presented in the House as articles of impeach-
ment against Justice Chase in 1804.39 But ultimately the charg-
es served as a sideshow to the partisan atmosphere that sur-
rounded the decision to impeach.
In the 1800 election, the Republicans led by Thomas Jeffer-
son won the presidency and took control of the House and Sen-
ate from the Federalists.40 The bench remained the final reposi-
tory of Federalist control.41 While Justice Chase's actions on the
bench were considered deplorable, for many observers the at-
tempt to impeach Justice Chase was a partisan power play by
Republicans to gain control of the judiciary.42 If Successful, the
impeachment would have had huge repercussions on judicial in-
dependence, as it would have set a precedent that lowered the
threshold for removal.43 The "good behavior" requirement of Ar-
ticle 11144 would have no longer been equated with the high
crimes and misdemeanor requirement of impeachment45 but in-
stead could have been employed by congressional majorities as a
38 There is some dispute about whether Justice Chase actually criticized the Jeffer-
son administration in his charge to the grand jury. Compare id at 838 (explaining that
Justice Chase denied he had ever criticized the administration in the grand jury charge),
with Jerry W. Knudson, The Jeffersonian Assault on the Federalist Judiciary, 1802
1805; Political Forces and Press Reaction, 14 Am J Legal Hist 55, 63 (1970) (describing
the grand jury charge as including "pointed references to Jefferson's administration").
39 See Knudson, 14 Am J Legal Hist at 62-63 (cited in note 38).
40 See Rehnquist, 50 Wash L Rev at 837 (cited in note 36).
41 See id at 838.
42 See Knudson, 14 Am J Legal Hist at 60-61 (cited in note 38) (describing the im-
peachment of Justice Chase as the culmination of a broader assault on the judiciary that
included the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 that created new judgeships and includ-
ed a measure prohibiting the Supreme Court from meeting for more than a year). See
also R.W. Carrington, The Impeachment Trial of Samuel Chase, 9 Va L Rev 485, 499
(1923) (arguing that Justice Chase's "acts of indiscretion were hardly of sufficient im-
portance to justify impeachment").
43 See Adam A. Perlin, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase: Redefining Judicial In-
dependence, 62 Rutgers L Rev 725, 728-29 (2010) ("Beyond preserving the composition of
the Supreme Court as it existed in 1805, Chase's impeachment trial likely did more to
define the boundaries of judicial independence and the scope of impeachment than any
other single event up to that time.").
44 US Const Art III, § 1.
45 US Const Art II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Trea-
son, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."). There has been an academic
debate about whether the Article III requirement that federal judges "shall hold their
office during good behavior" means that they can only be removed by standard of im-
peachment or that they can be removed according to a lower threshold. See Kaufman, 88
Yale L J at 691-703 (cited in note 28) (engaging the debate).
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political weapon to punish judges that displeased them.46 The ef-
fect would have been a dilution of branch independence, a corre-
sponding diminution of decisional independence, and greater ju-
dicial accountability for their decisions to Congress rather than
to the people's will as embodied in the Constitution.47 The House
without any debate voted along party lines to impeach Justice
Chase.48 In the Senate where Republicans had the numbers to
convict, Justice Chase was nonetheless acquitted.49 And with the
acquittal, legislative restraint preserved the independence of the
federal judiciary.
2. The history of state adoption of partisan elections: a
story of convergence to the federal model.
State legislatures were not similarly restrained in their uses
of the tools of removal of state judges in the period before and af-
ter the ratification of the federal Constitution. State constitu-
tions generally provided for the political appointment of judges
and for continued tenure in office during "good behavior."50 But
despite facial similarities in the form of selection, the relation-
ship between the state judiciaries and the political branches was
one of dependence rather than the independence of the federal
model.
Early Americans considered the legislatures to be the heroes
of the colonial period, and the Revolution was considered "the
46 See Carrington, 9 Va L Rev at 499 (cited in note 42) ("A conviction of Chase
might well have had a bad influence, and would have encouraged the Republicans in
their assaults upon the power of the judiciary.").
47 Charles Warren explained that the gravest aspect of the impeachment was
the theory which the Republican leaders in the House had adopted. . . . They
contended that impeachment must be considered a means of keeping the
Courts in reasonable harmony with the will of the Nation, as expressed
through Congress and the Executive, and that a judicial decision declaring an
Act of Congress unconstitutional would support an impeachment and the re-
moval of a Judge, who thus constituted himself an instrument of opposition to
the course of government.
Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 293 (Little, Brown 1947),
quoting Rehnquist, 50 Wash L Rev at 840 (cited in note 36).
48 Knudson, 14 Am J Legal Hist at 62 (cited in note 38).
49 Conviction on the articles of impeachment required a two-thirds super-majority
and Republicans held twenty-five of the thirty-four seats in the Senate, two seats more
than the two-thirds majority required to convict. See Rehnquist, 50 Wash L Rev at 839
(cited in note 36). The highest vote that any of the articles of impeachment received was
nineteen votes for Justice Chase's charge to the grand jury in Baltimore. See id.
50 See, for example, Delaware Const of 1776 Art 12 (superseded 1792); South Caro-
lina Const of 1776 Art XX (superseded 1778); Maryland Const of 1776 Art XXX (super-
seded 1851).
20131 63
11
Ross: Reconsidering Statutory Interpretive Divergence between Elected a
Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017
The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue
authentic expression of the public voice."51 At the same time, the
examples of arbitrary power by the king and the partial admin-
istration of laws by Crown judges contributed to a general dis-
trust of executive and judicial authority in the former colonies.52
Unsurprisingly, state legislatures retained substantial power in
the selection of judges.53 The legislatures also had the power to
subject judicial decisions to scrutiny. Through the exercise of
this power, legislatures provided parties to a case with the op-
portunity to appeal to the legislature, which had the authority to
order "new trials or pass private bills that provided them with
compensation denied them at trial."54 In addition, whenever a
judge issued an unpopular decision, he could be called to explain
the decision before the legislature.55
But state legislatures did not simply override or criticize
judges' decisions; sometimes they removed the judges them-
selves or legislated particular judgeships or entire courts out of
existence.56State legislatures also applied a lower threshold for
judicial "good behavior" than that maintained in the federal sys-
tem after the Justice Chase impeachment. As one scholar ex-
plained, "good behavior was understood as a standard of conduct
enforceable by the legislature."57 This combination of legislative
dominance over judicial selection, legislatures' frequent scrutiny
of judicial decisions, and their active removal of judges meant
that the principle of judicial branch independence was much
weaker than in the federal context. By the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the two judicial systems diverged. State judges tended to
have less decisional independence from legislative influence and
greater accountability to the legislature than federal judges.
51 F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change
in the State Courts, 33 J Legal Stud 431, 445 (2004).
52 See id at 444.
53 See G. Alan Tarr, Contesting the Judicial Power in the States, 35 Harv J L & Pub
Pol 643, 645-46 (2012) (describing legislative dominance over judicial appointments as
"a response to Americans' suspicion of executive power in general and of the executive
appointment power in particular"). Early Americans also sought legislative control over
the judiciary because of their suspicion of judicial power. See Hanssen, 33 J Legal Stud
at 440-41 (cited in note 51) ("In the nation's early years, state legislators ... were re-
garded as more reliable representatives of 'the people' than were state judges (colonial
judges had been faithful servants of the English Crown).").
54 Tarr, 35 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 646-47 (cited in note 53).
55 See id at 647 (describing the summoning of justices in Rhode Island in response
to a ruling invalidating a law).
56 See id at 647-48 (describing "ripper bills" that eliminated judges' positions or
courts).
57 Id at 648.
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Paradoxically, it was the adoption of partisan elections to
replace the system of appointment that moved states closer to
the federal model of judicial branch independence and accounta-
bility to the people's will as embodied in state constitutions. The
conventional historical account of the shift from appointments to
partisan elections is that it was designed to weaken the power of
judges in the era of President Andrew Jackson, during which
distrust of unaccountable exercises of power was particularly
strong.58 But given the highly dependent position of state judges
prior to the Jacksonian era, that interpretation is not particular-
ly plausible.
Instead, as recent scholars have shown, the purpose under-
lying the adoption of partisan elections was the exact opposite of
that suggested by the conventional account: they were intended
to strengthen rather than weaken judges59 Partisan elections
were adopted in the period after the Jacksonian era when popu-
lar distrust was directed toward legislatures who were seen as
corrupt and the source of bad policies that led to two economic
panics in a three-year period in the 1840s.6o Members of state
constitutional conventions sought to establish the courts as a
check on legislative behavior.1 The system of legislative ap-
pointment and exercises of removal authority had prevented the
court from checking legislative actions even when these actions
ran afoul of state constitutions. 6 2 Reformers therefore adopted
58 See Shugerman, 123 Harv L Rev at 1065-66 (cited in note 16) (describing the
conventional historical account).
59 See, for example, id at 1066 (noting that the adoption of judicial elections from
1846 to 1853 was part of a movement to strengthen judges); Hannsen, 33 J Legal Stud at
447-48 (cited in note 16) ("In brief, what was desired by the reformers was an independ-
ent court."); Nelson, 37 Am J Legal Hist at 203 (cited in note 16) ("[R]eformers wanted to
curtail the powers of legislatures."); Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline
of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges,
1850-1920, 1984 Am Bar Found Rsrch J 345, 348 ("[J]udicial reformers believed that the
democratic goal of popular accountability and the professional goal of an able, powerful
judiciary were reciprocal and reinforcing.").
60 See Shugerman, 123 Harv L Rev at 1076-80 (cited in note 16) (describing how
attitudes toward the legislatures changed in response to economic crises in the late
1830s that led to fiscal crises in the 1840s); Hanssen, 33 J Legal Stud at 448 (cited in
note 51) ("[W]idespread replacement of legislative and gubernatorial appointment of
state judges by partisan judicial elections was motivated by the rising perception of a
need for an effective third-party enforcer to monitor the actions of state legislatures-
elected representatives had been shown to be less faithful agents than anticipated.").
61 See Shugerman, 123 Harv L Rev at 1085-90 (cited in note 16); Hanssen, 33 J
Legal Stud at 446 (cited in note 51).
62 See Shugerman, 123 Harv L Rev at 1068 (cited in note 16) ("[T]he explicit pur-
pose of judicial elections was to bolster judicial power and to propel the courts toward
voiding more statutes [as inconsistent with the state constitution]."). See also Nelson, 37
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partisan judicial elections to give courts independence from the
legislature.
Contrary to the suggestion of Bruhl and Leib, partisan judi-
cial elections, unlike elections to other political offices, were not
adopted to make judges accountable to current popular prefer-
ences but instead to insulate judges from legislative power. This
conclusion is supported by the legislative histories underlying
the adoption of partisan elections and the way that the elections
were structured.63 It is also supported by the logic that the judi-
ciary would have been entirely redundant to the executive and
legislative branches. The adopters of partisan elections intended
for state judges, like their federal appointed counterpart, to be
accountable to the people's will as embodied in state constitu-
tions, and to use those constitutions to check legislative power.
Judicial independence from the legislature through a separate
base of power in the people provided state judges with the
means to be accountable to the people in this way. 64
From the perspective of judicial branch independence and ac-
countability to the long-term will of the people, the state adoption
of partisan elections marked a convergence with the federal mod-
el. A reasonable question raised by this account is why the states
did not simply adopt the federal model. The answer is simple:
most of the states already had been working from something
analogous to the federal model of selection.65 Prior to the shift to
partisan elections, most states maintained systems of appoint-
ment with tenure for "good behavior." But there is quite a bit of
flexibility in how political actors can interpret "good behavior."
Am J Legal Hist at 203 (cited in note 16) (arguing that reformers "wanted to check legis-
latures precisely because the legislatures were not reliably majoritarian").
63 See Shugerman, 123 Harv L Rev at 1088-91 (cited in note 16) (describing the
concerns of some opponents that judicial elections would lead judges to be responsive to
temporary passions and the response of proponents of judicial elections who "did not en-
vision a passive judiciary that would defer to 'the people' "); Hanssen, 33 J Legal Stud at
446 (cited in note 51) ("[W]hile Jacksonian reformers wished to make policy more re-
sponsive to the public will, court reformers were primarily intersted in protecting courts
from legislatures."); Nelson, 37 Am J Legal Hist at 224 (cited in note 16) ("[T]he judiciary
became elective not so much to permit the people to choose honest judges as to keep
judges honest once they reached the bench."); Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and
Impartial Justice, 58 Duke L J 623, 634 (2009) (describing the careful structuring to in-
sulate state elected judges from excessive popular preference, including long terms in
office, the staggering of elections, the prohibition on judges running for other elected of-
fices, and holding elections by districts rather than statewide).
64 See Hannsen, 33 J Legal Stud at 447 (cited in note 16) ("Judicial elections were
intended, first and foremost, to provide judges with an independent base of power that
would enable them to stand up to the legislative pressure.").
65 See, for example, Nelson, 37 Am J Legal Hist at 190 (cited in note 16).
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Very few state legislatures had followed the stringent definition
of "good behavior" as violable only through an impeachable of-
fense that was represented in the federal precedent of Justice
Chase's impeachment. The dilution of "good behavior" and the
use and abuse of other means of removal meant that these
states no longer saw an appointment system as a viable way to
ensure judicial independence and accountability to the state
constitution; they turned instead to partisan elections.
In sum, the history behind the adoption of the federal and
state selection models undermines the case for statutory inter-
pretive divergence between federal appointed and state elected
judges. The differences between the two selection processes
mask important similarities in the principles of judicial branch
independence and decisional independence from popular pres-
sure the two systems were trying to achieve. States did not
choose to elect judges to make judges' decisions more directly re-
flective of popular preferences, or to make them more like legis-
lators. Rather, they merely wanted judges to have the institu-
tional security necessary to enforce the constitution against the
legislature. There is little reason in the historical record to think
that elected judges should interpret statutes any differently
than appointed judges.
In the next Section, I argue that subsequent state reforms of
judicial elections further undermine the case for interpretive di-
vergence. These reform efforts provide further proof that the
system of electing judges was not intended to make state judici-
aries accountable to the current and temporary passions of the
people.
B. Reconsidering Accountability
Despite the historical purpose underlying the adoption of
judicial elections, the case for interpretive divergence continues
to be intuitively appealing. Subjecting judges to elections co-
heres with a basic understanding of the function of elections as
ensuring accountability to the people's current preferences. This
appears to be a clearly different form of accountability than that
secured through the political appointment of judges and perma-
nent tenure. However, this understanding essentializes ac-
countability by assuming the answer to the question: What are
elected judges accountable for?
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The context surrounding the adoption of partisan elections
and subsequent judicial reforms suggests that states sought to
maintain a different form of accountability for judges than that
premised on our conventional understanding of elections. In par-
ticular, the design choices of many states that maintained judi-
cial elections demonstrate that the reformers did not intend for
judges to be accountable to the current preferences of the people.
Instead, state judicial reformers throughout the twentieth cen-
tury designed state judicial elections to keep state judges ac-
countable to the people through enforcement of state constitu-
tions-a form of accountability consistent with the federal
model.
Changes to the judicial selection process that occurred over
the course of the twentieth century were implemented as a re-
sponse to evolving conceptions of the judicial role from legal
formalism to legal realism. These changes to the understanding
of what judges do required reforms to the selection process to
ensure that judges continued to be accountable for impartiality,
fairness, and defense of their constitutions rather than to the in-
terests represented in the cases they decided.
Opponents of the adoption of partisan judicial elections in
the mid-nineteenth century expressed concern that partisan
elections would make judges the tools of the people and would
undermine impartiality and fairness as well as fidelity to the
state constitution.66 Despite these dissents, proponents of parti-
san judicial elections were confident that partisan elections
would not have any of these effects. They believed that these
elections would, in fact, secure better judges because they would
be more independent from the political branches than they were
under the system of appointments and tenure during good be-
havior.67 This confidence arose from the leading view of the law
and judging at the time many states switched from appointment
processes to partisan elections in the mid-nineteenth century-
legal formalism.68
66 See Shugerman, 123 Harv L Rev at 1088 (cited in note 16) (describing opposition
to judicial elections).
67 See Hall, 1984 Am Bar Found Rsrch J at 348 (cited in note 59) (describing the
elimination of party patronage, which undermined the legitimacy of the courts, as one of
the justifications for the popular election of judges).
68 See Brian Z. Tamahana, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide 1 (2009) (describ-
ing the heyday of formalism as the period from the mid-nineteenth century to the early
twentieth century).
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According to legal formalism, the law was "autonomous,
comprehensive, logically ordered, and determinate."69 Judges
therefore "engaged in pure mechanical deduction from this body
of law to produce single correct outcomes."70 The role of judges,
in other words, was to mechanically apply the law to the facts of
cases and decide them accordingly, without recourse to their
personal ideologies or policy preferences. Influenced by the legal
formalism of the time, the predominant concern of many of the
participants in the state constitutional conventions was not that
the ordinary case lent itself to a partisan outcome. But instead,
the predominant worry was that fear of legislative removal had
led judges to be derelict in their duty to mechanically apply the
state constitution when the legislature overreached.71 Partisan
elections did not promise to correct this defect through the provi-
sion of judges responsive to the evolving preferences of the people,
since that had nothing to do with judging under the formalist ju-
risprudential model. Rather, the assumption was that this form of
selection would produce better quality judges who would not fear
removal for simply doing their job-even presumably when case
outcomes ran counter to current public preferences.
This formalist view of judging came under attack at the
turn of the twentieth century from the school of sociological ju-
risprudence that served as the precursor to the legal realism
school of the 1920s and 1930s. According to legal realists, the
law was indeterminate and dependent for its application to cer-
tain facts on external influences such as the judge's personal
values and ideology.72 As elite acceptance of the legal realist con-
ception of judging grew, reformers necessarily concluded that
having politically accountable courts undermined judicial inde-
pendence from popular pressure. Elected judges seen as influ-
enced in their decisions by values external to the law would be
expected to be accountable to the people in their exercise of dis-
cretion or face the possibility of removal in the next election.73
Thus, in the early twentieth century, legal realism implied a
state model of a judge selected through partisan elections that
69 Id.
70 Id. See also Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism about Electoralism: Rethinking Ju-
dicial Campaign Finance, 72 S Cal L Rev 505, 507 (describing legal formalism as "the
notion that law operates as a complete and discrete system of rules from which the an-
swers capable of resolving particular conflicts can be logically deduced").
71 See, for example, Nelson, 37 Am J Legal Hist at 196 (cited in note 16).
72 See Tamahana, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide at 3 (cited in note 68);
Abrams, 72 S Cal L Rev at 507 (cited in note 70).
73 Hanssen, 33 J Legal Stud at 448-51 (cited in note 51).
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demanded accountability to the current preferences of the peo-
ple. At the federal level, in contrast, legal realism entailed a
model of a federal judge appointed with permanent tenure who,
for the most part, remained insulated from these types of political
pressures. But rather than accept this apparent divergence be-
tween state and federal judges' structural incentives, state judi-
cial reformers sought to readapt the state system and to maintain
judicial independence and accountability to state constitutions,
re-aligning it with the goals of the federal model-albeit using dif-
ferent means than the federal model. While the state judicial re-
formers were unable to reinstitute a system of political appoint-
ments with permanent tenure, over the course of the twentieth
century they did enact reforms designed to insulate elected state
judges from popular encroachments on their independence.
One such reform was the shift from partisan to nonpartisan
elections in several states.74 By removing partisan labels from
judicial candidates during elections, the reformers deprived vot-
ers of the key piece of information that allowed voters to hold
judges accountable for their decisions.75 As a result, nonpartisan
elections evolved into low-key, low-information, uncompetitive
affairs that presumably lessened the pressure on judges to de-
cide cases in accordance with current popular preferences.76
A second reform designed to insulate elected judges from
popular pressures was the adoption of systems of merit selection
of judges accompanied by subsequent retention elections.77 In
merit selection systems, a nominating commission identifies
qualified judges and submits a list of candidates to the chief ex-
ecutive who chooses a nominee from the list.78 After the judge
has served for a certain period of time, usually less than five
years, the voters are presented with a referendum on whether to
74 See Hanssen, 33 J Legal Stud at 448-51 (cited in note 51).
75 See Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of
Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 Am J Pol Sci 951, 953 (2001) (describ-
ing a candidate's party affiliation as perhaps "the most important political heuristic").
76 See Brandice Canes-Wrone and Tom S. Clark, Judicial Independence and Non-
partisan Elections, 2009 Wis L Rev 21, 30 (describing the motivation underlying Pro-
gressive advocacy of nonpartisan elections as providing contests in which "professional
qualifications, experience, and other merit-based criteria would become central"); Law-
rence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter's Perspective, 64
Ohio St L J 13, 27-28 (2003) (citing studies showing that prior to 1995, nonpartisan judi-
cial elections were not particularly competitive).
77 See Hanssen, 33 J Legal Stud at 451-52 (cited in note 51) (describing the "merit
plan"-appointment followed by a noncompetitive retention election).
78 See id at 452.
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keep the judge.79 This process came as close as any to taking the
selection process completely out of the hands of the voters. Simi-
lar to nonpartisan elections, retention elections deprive voters of
the key piece of information about party affiliation that voters or-
dinarily use as the most important heuristic to hold judges ac-
countable for their decisions.80 Going further, retention elections,
by depriving the voters of even a choice between candidates, elim-
inate another mechanism for holding judges accountable to the
people: an opponents' campaign that can bring to public light
whether a judge's decision accords with popular preferences. Re-
tention elections have therefore tended to be even more low-key,
low -information, and uncompetitive than nonpartisan elections.*81
Finally, state limits on campaign speech represented the fi-
nal reform that limited the ability of voters to hold elected judg-
es accountable for deciding cases in accord with popular prefer-
ences. Promulgated in Canon 7(B) of the American Bar
Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972, candidates
for judicial office were prohibited from "mak[ing] pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impar-
tial performance of the duties of the office" and from "an-
nounc[ing] [] views on disputed legal or political issues."82 Only
eleven states failed to adopt the canon-ten of these states ei-
ther appointed judges or subjected them to merit selection (Con-
necticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Virginia) while
the eleventh state subjected judges to nonpartisan elections
(Idaho).83 Notably, every one of the states that subjected judges
to partisan elections adopted Canon 7(B). Through these speech
restrictions, states ensured that judges would not have to an-
swer for the substance of their decisions during campaigns.
To summarize, insofar as the institutionalist argument
overlooks the actual design of judicial elections, it overstates the
case for interpretive divergence. The shift from partisan to non-
partisan elections, the adoption of state merit selection processes,
and the limits on campaign speech were all efforts to bring the
state judicial systems into line with the federal model in response
to the rise of the legal realist views of judging. States sought to
79 See id.
80 Philip L. Dubois, The Significance of Voting Cues in State Supreme Court Elec-
tions, 13 L & Socy Rev 757, 757 (1979).
81 See Baum, 64 Ohio St L J at 27-28 (cited in note 76).
82 Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (ABA 1972).
83 See James J. Alfini and Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Elec-
tion Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 Ky L J 671, 675 n 14 (1989).
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preserve a form of judicial accountability different from that
which was expected of other elected officials. Rather than ac-
countability to current popular preferences, states reformed judi-
cial selection processes to ensure independence from these prefer-
ences and continued accountability to the state constitutions. The
reforms of state judicial selection processes to insulate state judg-
es, like their federal counterparts, from popular pressures thus
further undermine the case for interpretive divergence.
C. Reconsidering the Current Effect of Diverging Selection
Processes
This reexamination of the history of state judicial selection
processes and the form of accountability that states sought to
secure through reforms of the process undermines the case for
interpretive divergence. However, there is still one remaining
aspect of the Bruhl and Leib case for divergence that needs to be
considered. A focal point for their institutionalist case for inter-
pretive divergence rests on comparing the extremes from the
current context of judicial elections. In particular, their case for
divergence is based on a comparison between state judges sub-
ject to meaningful partisan elections on the one hand and feder-
al judges appointed to the bench with permanent tenure on the
other.84 For Bruhl and Leib, the difference in the relative compe-
tencies of these two types of judges supports the case for inter-
pretive divergence for three reasons. First, since state judges
subject to partisan elections must attain the approval of the
people to stay in office and federal judges need not, state judges
have a much stronger incentive to discern public opinion.85
These state judges are better able to gauge public opinion and
"incorporate the community's current values" into the interpre-
tation of statutes.86 Second, because many state supreme court
justices previously served in other public offices, they tend to
have a greater "degree of political savvy and comprehension."87
Finally, Bruhl and Leib suggest that these state judges are bet-
ter equipped than their federal counterparts to "draw on other
84 Bruhi and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1238 (cited in note 3) ("[T]o see if the argu-
ment for divergence works, we [ ] generally take 'unelected judges' to mean life-tenured
judges on the federal model and 'elected judges' to mean judges subject to frequent, com-
petitive partisan elections.").
85 Id at 1250 ("[E]lected judges have both more incentive and greater ability to
make fruitful use of popular opinion.").
86 Id at 1250-51.
87 Id at 1250.
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election results, their readings of the community's general sen-
sibilities, and so forth" to guide their decision making.88
In this Part, I argue that although judicial elections have
become more meaningful and state judges more responsive to
popular preferences in the present, the case for interpretive di-
vergence remains weak. The reasons are threefold. First, the
case for interpretive divergence does not adequately account for
the effect of special-interest pressure on judicial behavior. Such
special-interest pressure is the source and the product of mean-
ingful judicial elections, suggesting that such elections are a dis-
torted way of learning about the people's will. Second, even in
the context of meaningful judicial elections, statutory interpre-
tation issues are unlikely to be the salient subject of elections. It
is therefore doubtful that even state judges subject to meaning-
ful elections will receive much popular guidance from these elec-
tions on how to interpret statutes. Finally, even assuming that
state judges are able to tap into public opinion to guide their in-
terpretive choices through means outside of elections, the case
for divergence overlooks the empirically demonstrated capacity
of federal appointed judges to be guided in their decision-making
by popular preferences, even while relying on accepted modes of
statutory interpretation.
Prior to 1990, meaningful judicial elections, which Bruhl
and Leib define as those in which there are high levels of inter-
est, information, and participation,89 were extremely rare.90 As
discussed in the prior Section, this was by design. However, this
began to change with the inauguration of what scholars describe
as "new style" judicial elections that arose out of a confluence of
three factors.91 First, interest groups seeing the stakes in judicial
decisions began to spend large sums of money to influence elec-
tion outcomes. The success of corporate interests in changing the
composition of supreme courts from pro-plaintiff to pro-business
in states like Texas and Ohio in the 1980s inspired greater in-
terest-group activity in other state judicial campaigns.92 Second,
88 Bruh1 and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1251 (cited in note 3).
89 Id at 1252.
90 See Canes-Wrone and Clark, 2009 Wis L Rev at 30 (cited in note 76) (describing
judicial elections historically as low information contests in which "voters approach the
ballot box without a clear understanding of each candidate's qualifications or policy posi-
tions... , and media coverage of the contest is low").
91 See, for example, David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum L
Rev 265, 267-68 (2008).
92 See David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State
Judicial Selection, 69 Alb L Rev 985, 990-91 (describing the politicization of judicial
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interest-group activity in the form of campaign expenditures
translated into campaign advertisements that exposed voters to
judicial candidates in a way not previously seen.93
Finally, in 1990 the American Bar Association, fearing a
First Amendment challenge to the Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct prohibition on candidates announcing their views on dis-
puted legal or political issues, replaced it with a weaker prohibi-
tion.94 Shortly thereafter, twenty-five of thirty-four states
repealed their prohibitions on candidate announcement of views
on political and legal issues. In 2002, the US Supreme Court in
Republican Party of Minnesota v White95 held that Minnesota's
announcement clause, which mirrored Canon 7(B) of the 1972
ABA Model Judicial Code, violated the First Amendment.96 The
remaining nine states were therefore forced to repeal their pro-
hibitions on candidate announcement of disputed legal or politi-
cal issues.97 As one scholar lamented, after White candidates
were now free "to emulate their counterparts in political branch
races by committing themselves to positions on issues they are
likely to decide as judges."98
Judicial elections, however, have not entirely gone the way of
legislative and executive office elections. They still tend to be
comparatively low-key, low-information affairs. It is clear, none-
theless, that with every election cycle more and more judicial
elections, and particularly more and more partisan judicial elec-
tions, are meaningful. This is reflected in the increase in cam-
paign spending, issue-based advertisements, and competitiveness
contests in several states beginning with the California Supreme Court retention elec-
tion of 1986); Madhavi McCall, The Politics of Judicial Elections: The Influence of Cam-
paign Contributions on the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994-1997,
31 Polit & Pol 315, 319-20 (2003) (describing the influence of interest-group pressure on
transforming the Texas Supreme Court from a plaintiff-friendly institution into a pro-
business institution); Marie Hojnacki and Lawrence Baum, "New-Style" Judicial Cam-
paigns and the Voters: Economic Issues and Union Members in Ohio, 45 W Polit Q 921,
922-23 (1992) (describing the politicization of judicial elections in Ohio in the mid-
1980s).
93 James Sample, et al, The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-2009: Decade of
Change 8-9 (Brennan Center 2010), online at http://brennan.3cdn.net/
d09ldc9llbd67ff73b_09m6yvpgv.pdf (visited May 21, 2013) (describing the massive in-
crease in money spent on television ads for judicial candidates from 2000-2009).
94 The 1990 revisions to the American Bar Associations Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibited judicial candidates from making "statements that commit or appear to com-
mit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the Court." Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (ABA 1990).
95 536 US 765 (2002).
96 Id at 788.
97 See id at 774-75.
98 Geyh, 64 Ohio St L J at 64 (cited in note 30).
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of judicial races.99 But even in the context of meaningful judicial
elections, the case for interpretive divergence depends on three
critical and unfounded assumptions.
The first assumption is that these meaningful elections
cause judges to be more responsive to democratic preferences.
Bruhl and Leib acknowledge that judicial elections are vulnera-
ble to the pathology of other elections-special-interest influence
on election outcomes.100 And recent studies confirm this conces-
sion. These studies show that an important result of the in-
crease in meaningful judicial elections is an increase in cases de-
cided in a way that is favorable to special-interest groups that
contribute to judicial campaigns.101 For example, Professor Jo-
anna Shepherd recently found empirically that "contributions
from interest groups are associated with increases in the proba-
bility that judges will vote for the litigant favored by those in-
terest groups."102 Professor Michael Kang and Shepherd later
quantified the effect of campaign contributions, finding that a
"$1,000,000 contribution [from a business group] would increase
the average probability that a judge would vote for a business
litigant in any case by 30%."103 Unless we assume contrary to the
teachings of public choice theory that special-interest groups
represent the public interest, 104 these findings are troubling. To
the extent that such evidence supports a case for interpretive
divergence, it supports the imposition of greater constraints on
elected judges interpreting statutes responsive to popular pres-
sures since the primary source of these pressures is likely to be
special-interest groups.
The second assumption is that meaningful elections provide
elected judges with popular guidance on statutory interpretive
questions. Leaving aside the influence of special-interest groups,
it is not clear that this assumption is supportable even in these
new style judicial elections where voters have greater infor-
mation about judges' stances on the issues. Bruhl and Leib de-
scribe one particularly salient statutory interpretive question
99 See Sample, et al, The New Politics of Judicial Elections at 6-8 (cited in note 93).
100 Bruh1 and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1261-62 (cited in note 4).
101 See Shepherd, 58 Duke L J at 669-72 (cited in note 63); Michael S. Kang and
Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign
Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 NYU L Rev 69, 98-105 (2011).
102 Shepherd, 58 Duke L J at 629 (cited in note 63).
103 Kang and Shepherd, 86 NYU L Rev at 99 (cited in note 101).
104 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judi-
cial Review?, 101 Yale L J. 31, 35-44 (1991).
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raised in New York state courts regarding gay adoptions, 105but
this is a bit of an outlier. Most statutory interpretive questions
are not particularly salient and judicial elections tend not to fo-
cus on the issues that would provide judges with popular guid-
ance. Instead, as one scholar explained, in the standard judicial
election campaign "[e]very judge's campaign slogan, in advertis-
ing, and on billboards, is some variation of 'Tough on crime.' The
liberal candidate is the one who advertises: 'Tough but fair.' "106
While this is perhaps a slight exaggeration, the fact is that most
judicial campaigns focus narrowly on particularly salient issues
like crime and abortion.107 Even economic-interest groups seek-
ing to influence judicial elections tend to focus their advertising
on issues like the candidate's record on the death penalty or
views on abortion, issues completely unrelated to the interests
they seek to advance.108 While there are surely criminal and
abortion cases that raise statutory interpretive questions, it is
unlikely that judges obtain much guidance about how to address
these questions from elections. Issue-based campaigns tend to
rely on over-simplifications in which voters might learn whether
a candidate favors the death penalty or not, is pro-life or pro-
choice, or even is pro-business or pro-labor, and not much
more.109 The popular preferences derived from these campaigns
may provide judges with guidance on capital punishment and
sentencing, two areas in which empirical studies have shown
elected state judges to be responsive to public opinion.11o But the
guidance that elections provide to judges on popular preferences
regarding the interpretation of statutes is likely to be minimal.
105 Bruh1 and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1263-65 (cited in note 4).
106 Bert Brandenburg and Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The Endangered Bal-
ance between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 Georgetown J Legal
Ethics 1229, 1236 (2008) (citation omitted) (describing the effects of judicial elections on
decision making), quoting Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments,
61 S CalL Rev 1985, 2000 (1988).
107 See Canes-Wrone and Clark, 2009 Wis L Rev at 36 (cited in note 76) (noting the
growing importance of these issues in judicial campaigns).
108 See Baum, 64 Ohio St L J at 36 (cited in note 76) (noting that some interest
groups highlight social issues in their opposition to judicial candidates).
109 See id at 38 (discussing the lack of information available to voters in judicial
elections).
110 See Paul Brace and Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty,
and the Practice of Electing Judges, 52 Am J Polit Sci 360, 370 (2008) (finding "the death
penalty and public support for that punishment played a significant role in shaping the
overall ideology of state supreme courts that faced elections"); Gregory A. Huber and
Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Of-
fice?, 48 Am J Polit Sci 247, 248 (2004) (finding "Pennsylvania trial court sentences for
aggravated assault, rape, and robbery convictions . . . are significantly longer the closer
the sentencing judge is to standing for reelection").
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The third assumption is that even putting aside elections as
a mechanism for transmitting public opinion, state elected judg-
es are better able to discern popular preferences than federal
appointed judges. Bruhl and Leib describe elected state judges
as savvy politicians able to tap into broader community sensibil-
ities through means outside of the electoral channels.111 While
the authors do not make the contrast explicit, the case for inter-
pretive divergence would seem to depend on an account of feder-
al appointed judges who are politically insulated and therefore
disconnected from evolving public opinion. What this account
ignores is the wealth of empirical evidence to the contrary. Ra-
ther than being the countermajoritarian institution of legal
scholarly lore,112 empirical social science has consistently shown
that there is a statistically significant correlation between fed-
eral Supreme Court decisions and public opinion as measured by
the preferences of the lawmaking institutions,113 public opinion
polls,114 and aggregate measures of public mood.115 How do we
III Bruh1 and Leib, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1250 (cited in note 3).
112 Quite a bit of ink has been spilled advancing, criticizing, and testing Alexander
Bickel's contention that because federal judges are unelected and unaccountable, they
act in a countermajoritarian way when they invalidate laws enacted by the elected and
accountable branches of government. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16-23 (Yale 2d ed 1986).
113 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a Na-
tional Policy Maker, 6 J Pub L 279, 285 (1957) (finding that with the occasional lag, Su-
preme Court decisions are consistent with the preferences of the lawmaking majority).
114 Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court 78-80 (Unwin Hy-
man 1988) (finding that a clear majority of Supreme Court decisions decided between
1935 and 1986 were consistent with public opinion as reflected in polling and that there
is essentially no difference between the level of judicial and legislative responsiveness to
public opinion).
115 Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme
Court? Possibly Yes (But We're Not Sure Why), 13 U Pa J Const L 263, 280-81 (2010)
(finding an association between the public's mood and the ideological measure of dis-
aggregated Supreme Court decisions); Kevin T. McGuire and James A Stimson, The
Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to
Public Preferences, 66 J Polit 1018, 1021 (2004) (finding that individual justices are re-
sponsive to changing patterns in public mood over time); Roy B. Flemming and B. Dan
Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American
Policy Moods, 41 Am J Polit Sci 468, 485 (1997) (finding that individual justices are re-
sponsive to changes in public mood); William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, Public
Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic
Perspective, 58 J Polit 169, 189-90 (1996) (finding significant correlation between public
mood and the voting records of moderate justices but not liberal and conservative justic-
es); Michael W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the Supreme Court: Cross-Time Analyses
of Criminal Procedure and Civil Rights Cases, 48 Polit Rsrch Q 61, 72 (1995) (finding
strong linkages between public mood and Supreme Court decisions in the areas of crimi-
nal procedure and civil rights); James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S.
Erikson, Dynamic Representation, 89 Am Polit Sci Rev 543, 555 (finding significant
movement in court policy in response to changes in public opinion as measured by public
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make sense of these findings? Or to frame the question different-
ly, what is the mechanism of transmission for public opinion to
appointed judges?
The studies consistently show that one mechanism by which
the Supreme Court is kept attuned to popular preferences is the
nomination and confirmation process. 116 Like state elections, this
used to be low-key, low-information affairs. In fact, it was not
until the 1950s that Supreme Court nominees were subject to a
Senate hearing.117 But by the time of Judge Robert Bork's failed
nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987, the process turned
into a highly politicized affair in which past issue stances of
nominees were subject to heavy Senate and media scrutiny.118
Just as meaningful elections may have contributed to greater
responsiveness of state judges to particularly salient issues,
there is evidence that the meaningful nomination process has
had the same effect.
But it is not only the replacement of justices and changes to
the composition of the Court that scholars have determined con-
tribute to the responsiveness of the federal Supreme Court to
public opinion. Several studies have shown a direct effect of pub-
lic opinion on judicial behavior without proving the particular
pathway of influence.119 Judicial political adjustments and atti-
tude changes are currently the leading candidates. According to
mood); William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Counterma-
joritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 Am
Polit Sci Rev 87, 96 (1993) (finding that the aggregate partisan orientation of case out-
comes decided each year between 1956 and 1989 is consistent with a measure of public
mood over that period of time with a moderate lag of about five years). But see generally
Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010 Sup Ct Rev
103 (providing a general criticism of what he labels the majoritarian thesis); Helmut
Norpoth and Jeffrey A. Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 Am
Polit Sci Rev 711, 716 (1994) (finding that when "the president is elected on the basis of
issues orthogonal to those decided by the Court or in the absence of voter concern for ide-
ological issues," the Supreme Court is not responsive to public mood).
116 Robert Dahl first proved the replacement hypothesis, which suggests that Su-
preme Court responsiveness to the public opinion arises from changes to the composition
of the Court. See Dahl, 6 J Pub L at 293 (cited in note 113). There is now a near scholarly
consensus that the replacement of justices contributes to the responsiveness of the Court
to public opinion. See, for example, Epstein and Martin, 13 U Pa J Const L at 270 (cited
in note 115) ("Virtually all the studies demonstrate an indirect effect of public opinion
via the appointments process.").
117 Vicky C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure
of Article III Judges, 95 Georgetown L J 965, 982 (2007).
118 See Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 BU L Rev 273,
311-16 (1989) (describing the politicization nature of Judge Robert Bork's confirmation
process).
119 See note 115.
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the political adjustment hypothesis, justices recognize that the
continued legitimacy and power of the Court are dependent on
public approval of its judgments.120 Accounting for this, justices
are "careful not to jeopardize their collective authority or legiti-
macy by deviating too far or for too long from strongly held
views on fundamental issues."121 Other scholars relying on the
attitudinal change hypothesis have argued that the responsive-
ness of justices to public opinion is a product of changes in public
mood that influence the personal views of judges.122 This argu-
ment builds on the early insights of then-Judge Benjamin
Cardozo who explained, "The great tides and currents which en-
gulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass
the judge by." 123 Judges, in other words, even those who are po-
litically insulated through permanent tenure, are a part of "the
people" too. Regardless of the ambiguity about the pathways of
influence, the finding that federal judges are directly responsive
to public opinion strongly undercuts the case for interpretive di-
vergence based on the supposed relative advantage of state
elected judges in discerning this opinion.
Thus, even in the context of the new style of more meaningful
judicial elections in the states, the case for statutory interpretive
divergence between state elected and federal appointed judges
continues to be rather weak. Such elections have made state
judges particularly vulnerable to special-interest pressures, thus
undermining their democratizing effect. In addition, it is not clear
that meaningful judicial elections provide judges with much guid-
ance at all on most statutory interpretive questions. Finally, em-
pirical evidence suggests that despite the lack of an electoral
mechanism, federal judges tend to be much more responsive to
public opinion than the case for interpretive divergence suggests.
While no one has yet conducted an empirical study comparing the
relative responsiveness of state elected judges and federal ap-
pointed judges, even if a difference in responsiveness were to be
120 See, for example, Mishler and Sheehan, 58 J Polit at 173-74 (cited in note 114).
See also Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the
Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 374-75 (Farrar 2010) (argu-
ing that Supreme Court justices care about public opinion because "they do not have
much of a choice . . . if they care about preserving the Court's institutional power, about
having their decisions enforced, about not being disciplined by politics").
121 Mishler and Sheehan, 58 J Polit at 174 (cited in note 115).
122 See Micheal W. Giles, Bethany Blackstone, and Richard L. Vining Jr, The Su-
preme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages between Public Opinion
and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J Polit 293, 295 (2008).
123 Id, quoting Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 67-78 (Yale
1921).
20131 79
27
Ross: Reconsidering Statutory Interpretive Divergence between Elected a
Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017
The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue
found, it is not clear that it would support a case for interpretive
divergence.
CONCLUSION
Despite the efforts of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and oth-
er opponents of judicial elections, 124 Bruhl and Leib are right to
assert that judicial elections are not going away anytime soon.
In 1907, state supreme court justices in only eleven states were
insulated from elections. Over a century later, that number has
only risen to twelve.125 Rather than authoring scholarship criti-
cizing and defending judicial elections, we should engage the
critical question of what these elections mean for the judicial en-
terprise. Bruhl and Leib and others have started to lead the
way. However, with respect to statutory interpretation, I do not
think the existence of judicial elections favors the form of inter-
pretive divergence between state elected and federal appointed
judges suggested by Bruhl and Leib. The history, design, and
function of state and federal selection processes simply do not
support the case.
124 See, for example, Sandra Day O'Connor, Take Justice off the Ballot, NY Times A9
(May 23, 2010).
125 See Devins and Mansker, 13 U Pa J Const L at 463-64 (cited in note 3).
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